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Introduction
For those who want to do research into the state of Dutch democracy, there is no more going around 
the European Union. Ever since the European Community of Coal and Steel was founded in 1957 
there has been a gradual, ongoing process of European integration. As a result, more and more 
matters are decided in Brussels (Dinan, p. 3). That's why it is of growing importance to consider the 
European Union when making an analysis of the current standard of Dutch democracy.
The European Union has long been the sole domain of technocrats and civil servants. The Dutch 
voter was detached from European decision making and there was a permissive consensus on 
European integration because of the mostly economic advantages of European cooperation (Down 
and Wilson, p. 26). This consensus, however, has been declining since the nineties when decision 
making on European affairs became increasingly politicised (WRR, p. 5). The consensus seems to 
have been replaced with polarisation, with voters opting more and more to either favour or oppose 
the European project (Down and Wilson, p. 27).
In 2005 the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union was put forward to the voters of the 
Netherlands. The Dutch electorate rejected the Constitution with a resounding majority: 61.5% of 
voters voted down the Constitution (Kiesraad, 2005). The French had likewise rejected the 
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Constitution just a few days prior, through which the peoples of two founding nations clearly 
indicated their reservations for an ever closer Union. At this time, a large majority of 128 of the 150 
members of Dutch parliament were in favour of the Constitutional Treaty (Aarts, p. 243). It showed 
a large discrepancy between the public and the political elite on European issues. The Dutch MPs 
chose to respect the outcome of the referendum and did not ratify the treaty.
Another interesting aspect about the question of European integration is that it seems to have a 
special relationship to the left-right dimension of politics. Across Europe, (populist) political parties 
on the extreme left and the extreme right seem to be most opposed to further European integration 
whilst the parties in the middle ground are the most ardent supporters (Hooghe et al., p. 970). In the 
Netherlands, the parties on the extremes such as the SP, the LPF and more recently the PVV have 
garnered growing electoral support. Part of their rise in popularity might be explained by the subject 
of European integration. Their political message against the European project fits in well with their 
broader populist appeal against the governing elite (De Lange and Rooduijn, p. 321). They are able 
to tap into public discontent concerning the European integration project. As Paul Taggart puts it, it 
is a “touchstone of domestic dissent” from which parties on the extremes can expand their electoral 
base (Taggart, p. 384). European integration is widely supported amongst the political elite, but 
there is far fewer support amongst some parts of the general public. Populists use this gap between 
the elite and the people to expose the elite for their lack of responsiveness towards the needs and 
demands of the people.
Important to note is the fact that the topic of European integration for the Dutch electorate is a 
relatively unimportant subject with low salience. Voters determine their voting preferences by 
looking at other subjects, while the positions of Dutch political parties pertaining to the EU are of 
little import. Research by De Vries nonetheless shows that the importance of the EU in Dutch 
domestic politics has increased after the 2005 referendum, although the increase remains limited 
(De Vries, p. 163). However, with the advent of the recent European sovereign debt crisis (or 
‘eurocrisis’) and the veritable explosion of European decision-making, summit meetings and media 
coverage of these matters taking place the past few years, this theory might well need revision.
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Apart from the potentially low salience, there might also be other causes that led voters to reject the 
European Constitution in the 2005 referendum. The motivation of voters might not have a direct 
relationship with their approval or disapproval with further European integration. One study shows 
that the more negative voters were about the introduction of the euro and Turkish accession to the 
European Union, the more likely they were to vote ‘No’ at the referendum (Aarts and Van der Kolk 
2006, p. 244). There could be a multitude of other variables that explain why the Dutch voters 
rejected the Constitutional Treaty,
This thesis takes a closer look at the central claim of the (populist) politicians at the extreme ends of 
the Dutch political spectrum. Is there a gap between the elite and the people when it comes to 
positions on European integration. How big is this gap and how has it developed over time? Has the 
gap widened or gotten smaller since the referendum? It's these questions that this thesis endeavours 
to answer.
Research question
The goal of this thesis is to get a better understanding of the preferences of voters and 
representatives on the subject of European integration. In recent years European integration has 
risen on the political agenda to higher prominence, especially in 2011. The reason is the Sovereign 
Debt crisis or simply ‘eurocrisis’ involving the common currency. This makes it all the more 
important and pertinent to investigate whether the Dutch government and members of Dutch 
parliament are acting as responsive politicians.
Recent research focuses especially on the functioning of the European Union itself and the 
relationship between the European Union and the Dutch Lower House (Van der Steeg; 
Steunenberg). The authors consider whether there can still be a democracy to speak of in a situation 
where more and more decisions are taken at the European level, which is less accessible and harder 
to understand and grasp for the electorate. This thesis, however, has a completely different angle in 
mind. This thesis aims to study the relationship between Dutch voters and Dutch politicians and 
does not consider the views of those outside the Netherlands.
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One study of interest is that carried out by Van der Brug, De Vries and Van Spanje. The authors 
focus on the emergence of new conflict dimensions in Dutch politics, amongst which is the 
European dimension. Van der Brug, De Vries and Van Spanje signal declining support for the 
centrist parties and the rise of radical parties, which the authors claim is a result of the difficulties 
centrist parties have with the new conflict dimensions (Van der Brug, De Vries and Van Spanje, p. 
283). Their study is highly relevant to this thesis and will be expanded on.
The study of Van der Brug, De Vries and Van Spanje also demonstrates that the electorate has 
become more critical on the topic of European integration. In 1994 only 31% of the voters was of 
the opinion that European integration had gone too far, but in 2006 this ratio had risen to 55% (Van 
der Brug, De Vries and Van Spanje, p. 289). The study by Van der Brug et al., however, does not 
delve deeper into the European integration case and the views of politicians are determined through 
voter opinion studies.
This thesis aims to dig deeper where Van der Brug, De Vries and Van Spanje left off. By zooming in 
on the European question there is ample opportunity for further study. Also, the positions of 
politicians will not be determined by voter opinion studies but by studying the positions of 
politicians themselves.
For this study the following aim and research question are employed.
Aim: To gain an understanding and insight into the alleged gap between voters and politicians 
regarding the subject of European integration five years before and after the 2005 Dutch referendum 
on the European Constitutional Treaty.
The question that needs to be answered in this study is whether a gap exists between voters and 
representatives and how this possible gap has evolved in the period of 2000 – 2010. Furthermore, 
the study will look at the possible effect the referendum had on this development.
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Research question: What is the nature and development of the gap between voters and 
representatives on the subject of European integration in the period of 2000 through to 2010 and has 
the referendum on the European Constitution had an influence on this gap?
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis is that a gap has always existed, but that the gap was especially large at the 
beginning of our period under scrutiny. Our assumption is that this provided fertile ground for 
populism and parties on the extremes of the spectrum to grow. It is also therefore expected that the 
rise of populist parties such as the SP, the LPF and the PVV has led the gap to narrow.
The second hypothesis is that voters have become more critical about European integration after the 
2005 referendum. Voters have followed the opinions of opinion makers and politicians who have 
started speaking out against the European project.
Theoretical framework
In this study a couple of concepts are employed to enable our research into the opinions of voters 
and representatives on the topic of European integration.
Democracy can be understood to mean a great multitude of things. At its core, it is a system of 
government in which all members are treated as politically equal. They are all equally fit to 
participate in the process of decision making (Dahl, p. 37). How one goes about organising this 
participation has been debated at great length, but in this study we shall distinguish between two 
major schools of thought.
The first model of democracy is that of 'competitive elitism'. In this type of democracy, the 
electorate has the right to choose their leadership or elite at regularly held elections. The proponent 
of this democratic theory, Schumpeter, argues that there must be a division of labour between the 
electorate and the politicians they elect. The voters have a responsibility to elect and check their 
representatives, but once in power the politicians should have freedom to carry out their work 
(Held, p. 150) This theory of democracy has its roots in liberal democracy, which can be traced to 
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the works of John Locke and John Stuart Mill. The expression of public demands is left to 
representatives who answer to the public via regular elections (Held, p. 59). Elections enable a 
relationship between voters and representatives and the assumption of liberal democracy is that 
elections ensure that the representatives will voice the opinions of the public by and large.
The alternative model of democracy is that of participatory democracy. This model, which came out 
of the New Left movement, contends that the liberal democratic concept of 'free and equal' 
individuals is flawed (Held, p. 209). Their claim is that asymmetries of power exist, but that they 
can be reduced through more direct forms of democracy. In this new model, the existing system of 
competitive political parties should be complemented with direct democracy (Held, p. 211). This 
extends democracy from a system that only demands participation once every so many years during 
national elections to a system where the voters are involved more often in deliberation and in 
decision-making, e.g. through referenda.
The Dutch referendum was a unique instance, in the sense that until 2005 the Netherlands was one 
of the few European countries where a referendum had never been held at the national level (Aarts 
and van der Kolk, p. 88). The Netherlands is, like most Western European countries, a 
representative democracy where the elected representatives in parliament act on behalf of the 
people. But representative democracy and referenda are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A 
referendum can be a welcome addition to a representative system (Aarts and van der Kolk, p. 101). 
The extent to which the 2005 referendum had a reinforcing effect on Dutch democracy is one of the 
questions that this thesis seeks to answer.
The gap between voters and representatives is the difference in opinions between these two groups 
(Irwin and Van Holsteyn, p. 33). In the Netherlands, the commission Deetman studied the 
relationship between the electorate and voters and found there was a need for further involvement 
of voters through more direct democracy (Commission-Deetman, p. 19). Others have however 
argued that it couldn't hurt if the gap between voters and politicians in the Netherlands was widened 
(Koole, 1994). Debate over the supposed problematic relationship between the electorate and their 
representatives in parliament has thus far taken on many forms and points of view, and its relation 
to the question of European integration is no exception.
7
In this study, the relationship between the electorate and their representatives is seen through the 
lens of the political-economic approach. Voters and politicians are seen in this model as the demand 
and supply side of an electoral marketplace (Van der Eijk and Van Praag, p. 85). An invisible hand 
forces politicians to respond to demands from the public, much like Adam Smith saw the baker 
respond to demand from his customers in his classical economic theory (Barry, p. 99). The 
aforementioned gap would then exist if there was mention of market failure. Market failure in this 
sense means that supply and demand are not in balance. For instance, if voters in large numbers are 
opposed to further European integration but most politicians support further integration, then a gap 
exists between supply and demand in this sense.
The political-economic approach assumes that voters are rational actors that search for a political 
party that most corresponds to their own political preferences. This party gets the support of the 
voter, until the next elections are held, when the voter makes up his mind anew to decide who has 
earned their support in this round of elections. According to this theory a gap can emerge in a 
situation of market failure where supply and demand do not meet. This causes a surplus in demand 
to which political parties will respond by moving towards the newly emerging demand. According 
to this theory, the gap should remain limited in size. However, the assumption that voters are 
rational actors is contentious. Voters can have various other reasons for voting for a certain party, 
such as family tradition, pressure from friends or not wanting to act on behalf of their own interests. 
For this thesis, however, the model is the most appropriate because it fits well with the way we have 
defined the gap between voters and MPs.
On a further note, the comparison of the political arena and the marketplace is flawed because in 
politics there are only a limited number of suppliers. In the marketplace, the number of suppliers of 
bread are endless while in most West European democracies there are roughly five to ten political 
parties to choose from. Also, not all topics are equally salient. Economic issues, for instance, far 
outweigh the European integration in importance for the average voter. Nonetheless, it remains vital 
to the functioning of democracy to see whether opinions of voters on the topic of European 
integration sharply differ from those of political representatives.
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As pointed out earlier, De Vries emphasized the secondary importance of the European dimension 
in determining the electoral preferences of the Dutch voter. Therefore, a gap can exist on one topic 
while political parties may still be able to represent the opinions of the voters quite well on other 
topics. There are, after all, a number of eurosceptic parties in Dutch parliament but voters may have 
their reasons not to vote for these parties. But with the referendum of 2005 and the current debate in 
2012 on the 'eurocrisis' the importance of decision-making on various European questions is 
becoming more relevant to voters by the day.
Both voters and politicians alike think that there is a gap in Dutch democracy between the two 
groups. In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Study of 2006, two thirds of voters agreed that there is 
a gap between voters and politicians. The parliamentary study of 2006 also shows that Members of 
Parliament feel the same way: two thirds of them perceive the existence of a gap. The feelings seem 
to be both mutual and clear (Andeweg, p. 15). In this question, respondents are not asked to answer 
the question in relation to a specific issue, but more generally reflect on the possible existence of a 
gap.
The WRR, the Dutch Scientific Council on Government Policy, finds that a gap does exist between 
Dutch voters and the European Union (WRR, p. 23). The referendum on the Constitutional Treaty 
of 2005 was the first occasion, according to the WRR, for Dutch voters to discuss European 
integration and to give off a signal to the political elite. Others, such as Vollaard and Boer, warn that 
the gap should not be exaggerated (Vollaard and Boer, p. 200). The gap can take on many forms, 
ranging from discontent with the adoption of the euro to general mistrust of European institutions. 
In this study, we will look very generally at how the opinions of the Dutch voter on the question of 
European integration differ from those of their representatives in parliament.
The gap between voters and representatives in this study will be appraised through a quantitative 
statistical analysis. We will use existing data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies on the 
positions of the electorate on the issue of European integration. Data are available for 2002, 2003, 
2006 and 2010. We will also create our own data on the opinions of the Members of Dutch 
Parliament by coding the political programmes. By performing a Spearman's rho correlation 
analysis of the two variables we can determine the relationship (or correlation) between the two 
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variables per election year. Also, the data will be presented in graphs. These findings will be used to 
see whether the findings in this study can be supported by statistics.
Lastly, European integration is perceived in this study as the intensifying of cooperation between 
the member states of the European Union. When there is a transfer of sovereignty from national 
member states to the European Union, this is considered European integration. To decide whether a 
political party is in favour or opposed to further European integration, their political programmes 
can be studied to ascertain how often they subscribe to a transfer of power from the nation state to 
Europe, how often they suggest doing the opposite and how often they mention the desire to keep 
the power relationship in line with the status quo.
Methods
This study will compare quantitative findings on the opinions of the electorate with quantitative 
data on the opinions of Members of Dutch Parliament. Existing data will be complemented with 
new coding work which will be done especially for this study.
This thesis will use an interrupted time series design. This means that two tests will be performed 
before and after the event of the European Constitutional Treaty referendum of 2005. The idea is 
that this event had an impact on the opinions of voters and/or representatives. This will be studied 
by collecting data from before and after the 2005 referendum regarding political positions on 
European integration and analysing them statistically for correlation.
In an interrupted time series design a test is repeated several times, and in this case on the same 
group of people. The two groups are the Dutch electorate and the political representatives in the 
Lower House of Dutch parliament. The test is repeated a number of times before and after the 
European referendum to ascertain whether there is a trend that is dependent or independent of the 
event of the referendum. In this case, the elections of 2002 and 2003 will provide us with data prior 
to the referendum and the 2006 and 2010 elections will yield data after the referendum.
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If the hypothesis is to be found accurate, then a correlation analysis will have to demonstrate that 
the relation between the voter positions and those of the MPs should have been weaker initially in 
2002 and 2003 and stronger in 2006 and 2010. A correlation (Spearman's rho) analysis will be 
employed because in this study the correlation coefficient value indicates the strength of the relation 
between the two variables and to what extent they move in the same direction.
Operationalisation
Measuring the gap will take place through the use of quantitative data. Our data will reflect the 
opinions of both the electorate and their representatives in Dutch parliament.
The data on the opinions of the Dutch voters will be gathered from the Dutch Parliamentary 
Electoral Studies (DPES, or Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek in Dutch). These data include information 
on the opinions of Dutch voters and are collected around every national election. The elections that 
can be studied are those that took place in 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2010. In the survey there is a 
recurring question on how the respondent feels about European integration: whether they support or 
reject it. The answers are given on a scale from 1 to 7. From the responses to this question at these 
four elections we can ascertain the position of the Dutch electorate on the question of European 
integration throughout the years under scrutiny in this study.
The positions of political representatives can be determined by analysing the content of political 
party programmes. Content analysis is a research technique for making an objective, systematic and 
quantitative assessment of the content of communication (Bryman, p. 274). Through content 
analysis of the programmes on the topic of European cooperation, it can be ascertained how the 
representatives in parliament thought about the European dimension in Dutch politics. The positions 
of the parties will be coded according to a coding scheme enclosed in this thesis. Every paragraph in 
the programme that pertains to the question of European integration will be coded on a scale from 1 
to 5, with 1 corresponding to the position of rejection of further European integration and position 5 
corresponding to the position of advocating further European integration. This analysis should 
demonstrate whether there has been a shift in how parties think (and hence write) about European 
integration over the years 2002-2010.
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The difference between the Dutch Parliamentary Electoral Studies on the one hand and the coding 
of political programmes on the other is that the DPES are a questionnaire put before voters while 
programmes are written documents composed by commissions and edited by congresses. A 
questionnaire provides us with understanding of political positions at the individual level, while 
coding a party programme gives us an understanding of the position of an entire political party. The 
way party programmes are established varies amongst the Dutch political parties, but it can be said 
that they all accurately reflect the position that a party takes on the topic of European integration. 
Members of Parliament are bound by the party programmes and feel that to deviate from this 
platform would come at a cost to them. It is therefore that the use of party programmes in this study 
can be justified.
What also differs between DPES data and our own coding data is the fact that the DPES results 
come directly from a respondent, while the coding data is an interpretation of paragraphs of party 
programmes by the author of this thesis. It is therefore important to have a clear description of the 
coding process, as to enable others to conduct a similar or identical study with the confidence that 
the results will be nearly identical. The coding scheme provides a higher level of validity to the 
findings of this study.
The coding results are comparable, because in both instances the same question is asked: do you (or 
does the party being studied) support further European integration. The DPES data are coded on a 
scale of 1 to 7, while the party programme coding is done on a scale of 1 to 5. In comparing the 
findings below, the results from the DPES are converted to the scale 1 – 5. All data is freely 
available with the author.
Findings
For this study, a content analysis has been carried out of the party programmes of all the political 
parties that were represented in the Dutch Lower House after the elections of 2002, 2003, 2006 and 
2010. The analysis follows the coding scheme rules laid out in Appendix A. By analysing the 
paragraphs of the party manifestos that refer to European integration, a systematic scan was made of 
the position a party takes on European integration. This helps us to ascertain the positions of 
political representatives on the topic of European integration.
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The results give an indication of what the Dutch Lower House thinks of European integration. The 
Members of Parliament (MPs) have the freedom to deviate from their party manifestos, but in the 
Dutch political culture most voting takes place as part of the parliamentary group. In such instances, 
the party looks at the manifesto to determine their position on various matters.
The opinions of MPs are partly based on party programmes but can also be determined by other 
factors such as recent events, shifts in public opinion or changes in party policy halfway through a 
parliamentary period. The contention in this study, however, is that an analysis of party programmes 
is the best feasible study of MP positions on European integration. Firstly, because the saliency of 
European issues is fairly low and hence not subject to much policy change during a parliamentary 
period. Secondly, an analysis of e.g. media appearances of MPs on the topic of European integration 
would be a very time-consuming and costly way of analysing our topic.
The coding, ranging from 1 to 5, represents two extreme positions of opposing or favouring further 
European integration. Integration is seen as a transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the 
European Union. The period 2002-2010 saw four national elections take place in the Netherlands. 
The 2003 elections, however, were somewhat hurried in nature. They followed the collapse of 
government just shortly after the 2002 elections, when the LPF blew up the coalition. As a result, 
the party programmes of some parties were not fully rewritten but instead resembled pamphlets. 
Nonetheless, these documents from 2003 contain sufficient mention of European policy to warrant 
an inclusion in this study.
Positions of Members of Parliament
The findings on the positions of Members of Dutch Parliament on the topic of European integration 
are displayed below. They indicate a clear swing from fairly pro-European positions in the period 
leading up to the referendum, and a substantial drop in support straight after the referendum in 
2006. The three major parties, especially, seem to have responded to public discontent over 
European integration.
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Table 1.1 European integration positions of Dutch parties 2002-2010
2002 2003 2006 2010
CDA 4 4 3.33 4.25
PvdA 4 4 2.8 3.33
VVD 3 3 2.5 2.7
D66 3.66 4 4.33 4.8
SP 1 1 1.33 1.66
GrL 3.7 4 3.25 4.66
LPF 2.5 2.66
PVV 1.25 1
ChrUnie 2 2 3 3.4
SGP 2.66 2.66 3 2.33
PvdD 3 2
Leefbaar 3
Note: The positions shown here are the result of coding work, placing the party programme on a scale of 1-5, with 1  
reflecting rejection of further European integration and 5 reflecting support for further European integration
The three major parties, CDA, PvdA and VVD, have traditionally formed the heart of Dutch 
politics. Their support of European integration is quite large in 2002 and 2003, especially with CDA 
and PvdA. The fourth centre party, D66, too has a supportive score of 3.66 and 4, indicating that the 
entire political centre ground is (moderately) pro-European in the period leading up to the European 
Constitutional referendum of 2005.
The only strong opposition to the European project comes from the SP, the Socialist Party. They 
strongly oppose further integration and wish for powers to devolve back to the Netherlands. In the 
2002 elections they however only garnered 9 seats in parliament out of 150. Other parties that 
moderately oppose integration are the orthodox Christian SGP and ChristianUnion and the new List 
Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The LPF, however, scores a surprisingly moderate score of 2.5.
The 2005 Constitutional Treaty referendum, which was rejected with 61.5% of the votes cast, came 
as a great surprise to the political representatives in Dutch parliament. As the scores show, the vast 
majority of political parties and hence politicians supported further European integration, which 
was laid down in the Treaty. If we look at the four centre parties who favoured a positive outcome 
for the referendum, they alone held 97 seats in parliament in 2002 and a whopping 120 seats from 
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2003 onwards, representing 65% and 80% of seats in parliament respectively. With a clear majority 
supporting ratification of the European Constitution in parliament, the gap was made very apparent 
when 61.5% of Dutch voters rejected the treaty.
The coding results for the new parliament, elected in 2006, show a remarkable responsiveness 
amongst the political elite. The three major centre parties CDA, PvdA and VVD have all moved 
away from their pro-European stance and more towards euroscepticism. The Labour party (PvdA), 
especially, has moved from position 4 to 2.8, signaling they are very responsive to the eurosceptic 
outcry voiced during the Constitutional Treaty referendum campaign. On the side of the eurosceptic 
parties, we see the SP maintain its position, but their voice in parliament is almost tripled as they go 
from 9 to 25 seats. This electoral reward might come partly from their opposition to the European 
Constitution. Also, newcomer in parliament PVV takes a strong position against further European 
integration alongside the SP, reinforcing the eurosceptic front in Dutch parliament.
What the coding results also show, is that after the initial fall in support amongst MPs for European 
integration in 2006, the 2010 results show that most parties make moves to take up their old 
positions from before the referendum. CDA, PvdA and VVD partly or completely return to old 
scores, demonstrating that the referendum effect is not lasting on their political platforms. The 
Christian-democrats even take a strongly pro-European position, as do D66 and the GreenLeft. The 
latter two take especially radical positions as the most fervent proponents of European integration, 
whilst the PVV takes up the position at the other end of the extreme. The European debate in the 
Netherlands seems to have polarised in this sense.
These developments indicate that the discussion after the referendum has taken on a new form. No 
longer is European integration a topic that divides the old political centre, but it's the newcomers to 
the political arena who have positioned themselves on radical positions of the European debate. 
This rise of the radical parties and consequent fall of the three old centre parties was also evident at 
the European Parliament elections of June 2009. At these elections, the three centre parties lost a 
sizable amount of electoral support, dropping from 61.2% in 2004 to 43.5% in 2009. At the same 
time, the parties most strongly in favour or against European integration (PVV, SP, D66 and the 
GreenLeft) saw their electoral appeal increase from 18.6% in 2004 to 44.3% in 2009 (NRC, 2009).
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Positions of Dutch voters
With the positions of political representatives having been established, our attention moves to the 
positions of the Dutch electorate. The data used here is that of the Dutch Parliamentary Electoral 
Studies (DPES, NKO in Dutch) which is carried out every election year. It includes a questionnaire 
that asks thousands of Dutch voters about their positions on several topics, including European 
integration. Voters are asked to position themselves on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means that the 
respondent wants European integration to proceed while 7 means that the integration process has 
gone too far.
Data from the DPES shows that the Dutch electorate has moved substantially too, when it comes to 
the question of European integration (see Table 1.2 below). Asked whether European integration 
should proceed or whether it had gone too far, 35.3% of Dutch voters in 2002 responded that 
integration should go further while 40.6% said it had gone too far. In 2006, after the referendum, the 
positions of the electorate had become more eurosceptical. Of the respondents in 2006 only 25.9% 
felt European integration should proceed, while 54.8% felt that it had gone too far (Aarts, Van der 
Kolk and Rosema, p. 177). In the DPES results of 2010 we see balance returning somewhat, with 
32.2% saying integration should proceed while 43.3% oppose such a move.
Table 1.2 European integration positions of Dutch voters 2002-2010
02-03 06 10
Integration should proceed 35.3 25.9 32.2
Centre position 25.1 19.3 22.4
Integration should stop 40.6 54.8 43.3
No response 3.1 5.5 2.1
Source: NKO 2002-2003, 2006 and 2010
This widening of the gap between supporters and critics of European integration amongst the 
electorate signals the direct effects of the debate on the European Constitutional Treaty referendum. 
As a result of the referendum, the electorate had been given the opportunity to inform themselves 
on the topic and to form an opinion. Clearly, the public was increasingly feeling the need for the 
European integration process to slow down.
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Comparing voter and MP positions
Having obtained data on the positions of the electorate and Members of Dutch Parliament, it is now 
also possible to compare the results for the four periods that are under scrutiny in this study. The 
2002 and 2003 elections are two cases before the 2005 referendum, whereas the 2006 and 2010 
elections took place afterwards. Data for the positions of MPs has been gathered for all four 
instances. The DPES study of 2002 and 2003 has been merged by the scientists conducting the 
study, because the two elections took place so quickly after one another (15 May 2002 and 22 
January 2003). The surveys were collected before both elections and the data will therefore be used 
to analyse both the 2002 and 2003 elections.
In analysing the four elections, we have adjusted the DPES electoral survey data to be comparable 
to the MP data. Both positions have been modified to range from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating 
opposition to further European integration and 5 indicating support. We have created graphs for 
both the electorate and the MPs. One of the lines shows us which party holds which position on the 
European integration scale, plus it shows us the number of seats they have in parliament. With the 
Dutch electoral system the composition of parliament is a very accurate reflection of the wishes of 
the voters because of the (extreme) system of proportional representation (Andeweg and Irwin, p. 
77). The line thus represents the number of Members of Parliament that represent a certain position 
on the 1-5 scale of European integration. The second line on the graphs represents the proportion of 
respondents in the DPES survey that chose a certain score on the 1-7 scale in the survey question on 
European integration.
Comparing the two lines will give us a good indication of how well, or how inadequate, Dutch 
parliament represents the Dutch electorate on the issue of European integration. We now turn to the 
results, displayed in four graphs below.
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The 2002 results show a misrepresentation in parliament, where most MPs appear to be more pro-
European than their voters. The MPs, indicated with the green line, take a more pro-European 
integration position in most cases, with many MPs more than a full point on the scale ahead of their 
voters. Also, a number of voters who themselves are strongly in favour of European integration do 
not have a voice in parliament. The highest position on the scale, 5, is supported by 7.1% of the 
electorate, but there are no MPs who share this position. Thus, the graph clearly exposes a gap in 
the parliamentary representation on the issue of European integration. Most MPs are more europhile 
than their voters, leaving a large number of voters ill-represented in Dutch parliament.
The picture for 2003 exposes an even greater gap between the electorate and their representatives in 
the Dutch Lower House. With the DPES results on the positions of the electorate being the same in 
both 2002 and 2003, the only change in this graph comes from the positions of MPs. The gap has 
grown to dramatic proportions, with a clear parliamentary majority supporting further integration 
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while the Dutch electorate is far more spread across all five positions. The major cause for this shift 
is the reemergence of the Labour party in Dutch parliament, which strengthened the pro-European 
camp in parliament substantially. Also, the 2003 elections saw the LPF lose a large share of its votes 
and thus MPs. This caused a shift towards the pro-European integration position in parliament that 
further enlarged the gap between voters and their representatives.
The 2006 elections show a clear shift towards a more eurosceptic reality in Dutch politics. With the 
2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, both the electorate and the political elite moved 
towards more eurosceptic positions. In the new Dutch parliament, only three MPs (of D66) 
supported further European integration, while the majority moved towards the centre position on the 
1-5 scale. Also, a substantial number of both voters and MPs moved towards the most eurosceptical 
position. This graph shows us a shrinking gap between the electorate and MPs, which indicates that 
the responsiveness of the political elite has grown on the topic of European integration.
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Lastly, the 2010 elections show us two things. Firstly, the gap between voters and Members of 
Parliament has become the smallest of all four elections studied in this thesis. The lines of the 
positions of both voters and MPs seem to nearly converge, with both the centre and the two extreme 
positions of support and rejection of further integration all very well represented in Dutch 
parliament. Secondly, the positions seem to have restored somewhat to where they were before the 
2005 Constitutional Treaty referendum. The initial effects of the referendum seem to have worn off 
and other factors have led people to regain their (moderate) enthusiasm for European integration.
Statistical findings
The data from the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies and the coding results for the Members of 
Parliament are put through a correlation analysis (Spearman's rho) in SPSS to ascertain the 
relationship between the two variables. Both variables have N=150. The DPES data have been 
simplified to 150 results, with the same scale of 1-5 as the MP coding data. This enables a 
Spearman's rho correlation analysis in SPSS.
In correlation, the relation between two variables is perfect when the correlation coefficient is either 
1 or -1. A coefficient of 1 means that the two lines completely correspond and that every change in 
the line in one variable is copied in the other variable. A coefficient of -1 means that the correlation 
is negative, meaning that with every change for one variable, the opposite takes place in the other 
variable. Finally, a correlation coefficient of 0 means that there is no relation between the two 
variables whatsoever.
The data have also been presented in graphs 1 through 4, so the findings in SPSS should confirm 
our observations from these graphs.
Correlations 2002
mp_pos nko_pos
Spearman's rho mp_pos Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .923**
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000
N 150 150
nko_pos Correlation Coefficient .923** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 150 150
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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The correlation coefficient for 2002 is .923. This indicates a moderately strong relationship between 
voters and their representatives. This corresponds with Graph 1, which shows a substantial gap 
between voters and representatives. With a p-value of .000, the correlation is seen as significant.
Correlations 2003
mp_pos nko_pos
Spearman's rho mp_pos Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .823**
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000
N 150 150
nko_pos Correlation Coefficient .823** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 150 150
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The correlation coefficient for 2003 is .823. This indicates a fairly weak relationship between voters 
and their representatives, with a substantial move away from the previous position of .923. This 
finding is in line with what we found to be a large gap in Graph 2. The parliament that sat from 
2003 to 2006 showed the largest gap from all four elections under scrutiny in this study. With a p-
value of .000 this correlation is significant.
Correlations 2006
mp_pos nko_pos
Spearman's rho mp_pos Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .969**
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000
N 150 150
nko_pos Correlation Coefficient .969** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 150 150
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The correlation coefficient for 2006 is .969. This indicates a moderately strong relationship between 
voters and their representatives, similar to the 2002 data, with a large increase in the 
correspondence between the position of the Dutch voter and the position of the Dutch MPs 
compared to 2003. The gap has narrowed substantially between voters and representatives after the 
21
2006 elections, which demonstrates the effect of the referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. With 
a p-value of .000, this correlation is significant.
Correlations 2010
mp_pos nko_pos
Spearman's rho mp_pos Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .984**
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000
N 150 150
nko_pos Correlation Coefficient .984** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 150 150
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The correlation coefficient for 2010 is .984. This indicates a very strong relationship between voters 
and their representatives, with an almost perfect correlation. This strong relationship shows us that 
the gap has almost been closed and this corresponds with Graph 4 which showed the same results. 
Again, as with the previous correlation analyses, the p-value is .000 which means that the 
correlation is significant. Since the 2010 elections, the MPs very strongly reflect the opinions of 
Dutch voters on the question of European integration.
General findings
The findings from both the graphical presentations and the statistical analysis point in the same 
direction. A gap certainly existed in 2002 (correlation coefficient .923) and was even larger in 2003 
(correlation coefficient .823), with the referendum of 2005 triggering a correction that led to a 
narrowing of the divide in 2006 (correlation coefficient .969) and especially in 2010 (correlation 
coefficient .984). These statistical findings correspond with our analysis of the four graphs with the 
same data.
Overall, the shift towards more opposition to European integration that we perceived after the 2005 
referendum was strong in 2006 but was weakened again in 2010. Although the level of support for 
further European integration might have been lowered by the referendum and the political debate it 
caused, the effects seem not to persist over time. The possible explanations are endless. During the 
start of the financial crisis in 2008, there was much mention of the benefits of being part of the 
European Union and having a common currency to avoid currency wars. At the same time, the 
current Sovereign Debt crisis might be having the reverse effect, which might be even more 
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profound on the levels of support for European integration than the 2005 referendum. Only time 
will tell, and these questions clearly lay outside the scope of this study.
The findings also confirm that the closing of the gap is caused by the emergence and rise of parties 
on extreme positions of the European issue. Parties such as the SP, PVV, D66 and GreenLeft have 
gained seats in the 2006 elections and as a result have been able to close the gap in representation 
that existed in 2002 and especially in 2003 (Rosema, Aarts and Van der Kolk, p. 175). The 
European issue has provided these parties with an opportunity to distinguish themselves from the 
centre parties and this has resulted in electoral success for them and loss of seats for the three centre 
parties.
Conclusions
The effect the European Union has on the functioning of democracy in the numerous member states 
of the Union is a fascinating, ongoing process which is part of the unique character of the European 
integration process. With more powers being transferred to Brussels, so does the importance grow 
for European policy in the domestic political arena. For a long time, there was a permissive 
consensus amongst the European electorate about European integration. Its implications were not 
directly felt by voters, and if they did notice a change, it was by and large for the good.
But with ongoing integration came rising tension over whether the scope and scale of integration 
was necessary and beneficial and voters felt they had not had ample opportunity to be heard on the 
matter. This certainly applies for Dutch voters, who have started to voice their unease with the 
European project more and more. The introduction of the euro, the expansion towards Eastern 
Europe and the introduction of ever growing bodies of European legislation has made Dutch voters 
aware of a democratic deficit within their own political system. Most clear expression of this was 
the outcome of the Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty in 2005.
The European question has become more political, and as a result Dutch Members of Parliament are 
being forced to be more responsive on the issue. Voters will no longer accept a large discrepancy 
between their own views and those of their representatives. With the growing importance of the 
European Union, this is only a natural development. The findings of this study show that there is a 
substantial gap between the opinions of the Dutch electorate and their representatives in parliament 
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in 2002 and, especially, in 2003. The Lower House which sat from 2003 to 2006 was for the most 
part very much in favour of further European integration. The three centre parties in parliament 
were strongly represented with 114 seats out of 150, and they all shared a moderate support for the 
European project.
It was in this political reality that the 2005 referendum caused major upheaval. The political elite 
had not seen the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty coming and was surprised to find 
that they had not been representing their electorate that well. The 2005 referendum served as a 
correction, a lesson for the political elite in The Hague, that voters were insufficiently being heard. 
And although the question of the referendum was not literally “Do you want European integration 
to proceed”, the implications were very clear. The Constitution would have meant a further transfer 
of sovereignty to the European Union and the voters were keenly aware of this. Thus, their rejection 
of the referendum could be translated into a rejection of further integration.
The Members of Dutch Parliament responded in due course at the 2006 parliamentary elections by 
adjusting their programmes to reflect the opinions of the electorate more closely. The sentiment 
towards the EU became more reserved and more critical, with the three centre parties moving from 
europhile to more eurosceptic positions. This brought the opinions of voters and their 
representatives more in line with one another, but still there was a gap. Voters were still fairly 
spread across the European scale, whilst most MPs took positions close to the centre position of 
neither favouring nor opposing further European integration.
As a whole, though, the referendum had a profound effect of improving democratic representation. 
The concerns and opinions of the public had not been heard for various reasons, but the referendum 
gave them an opportunity to voice their dissent and send a signal to their representatives in 
parliament. The signal was heard and taken seriously, with new MPs listening more closely to their 
constituency. In this sense, democracy was reinforced through the referendum. At the same time, 
people were dismayed at the fact that the new treaty that was to replace the Constitutional Treaty, 
the Lisbon Treaty, was not put to a vote in a new referendum.
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The 2010 elections show us finally that the gap between the electorate and their representatives in 
parliament seems to have almost closed. Parties in parliament have become far more responsive to 
their constituents on the question of European integration and now cover the full spectrum of 
opposition, support and the middle ground. The parties that seem to benefit most from this, are the 
parties on the extreme end of the European question. Our study shows that their electoral support 
has risen substantially over the period under scrutiny. The democratic gap seems to have closed, in 
part thanks to the emergence of these parties in Dutch parliament.
On the question of European integration, the Dutch voters seem to have moved away from their 
skeptical positions just after the 2005 referendum and veered back towards their old positions. 
Neither the supporters nor the opponents of further integration have a clear majority amongst the 
population or in parliament, with the moderate centre ground regaining strength. But the DPES and 
party programmes of 2010 may be outdated already, when we consider the pace at which events are 
unfolding in Europe these last few months.
The 2005 referendum seems to have had a profound impact on the representation of popular 
opinions on the question of European integration. The substantial gap that could be found in 2002 
and 2003 seems to have all but disappeared. This is largely due to the successful emergence of 
(populist) parties such as the SP and PVV. However, the pro-European parties D66 and GreenLeft 
too had a large contribution to make in bridging the divide between people and politicians. The idea 
that only populists have benefited must therefore be rejected.
The second hypothesis, too, must be partially rejected. The voters and MPs have both become more 
eurosceptic after the 2005 referendum, but they also returned to their old positions to a large extent 
in the 2010 elections. The effects of the referendum seem to have been only temporary and are but 
one of many causes for public opinion to shift. The economic crisis and consequent ‘eurocrisis’ 
have had and will be having a profound impact on the opinions of the electorate.
But in all, the effect of the referendum seems to be very much complementary to Dutch 
representational democracy. A deficiency in the representation of the Dutch people has been 
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corrected and as a result the Dutch MPs are highly responsive on the issue of European integration. 
Democracy seems to have come out as the winner.
26
Literature
Aarts, K., H. van der Kolk and M. Rosema, (eds.) (2006) Een verdeeld electoraat: de 
Tweede Kamerverkiezingen van 2006. Spectrum, Utrecht.
Aarts, K., and J. Thomassen (2008) Dutch Voters and the Changing Party Space
1989-2006. Acta Politica 43(2-3): 203-234.
Aarts, K. and H. van der Kolk (2005) Nederlanders en Europa : het referendum over de 
Europese grondwet. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker
Aarts, K. and H. van der Kolk (2006) “Understanding the Dutch ‘No’: The Euro, the East
and the Elite.” PS, pp. 243-246
Andeweg, R.B. and G.A. Irwin (2002) Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Andeweg, R.B. and J. Thomassen (2011) Van afspiegelen naar afrekenen? De toekomst van 
de Nederlandse democratie. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
Arnold, C., Franklin, M. and Wlezien, C. (2010) The impact of Public Opinion on European 
Union Legislative Decision-Making. APSA, Washington.
Barry, B. (1978) Sociologists, economists and democracy. Chicago and London: Phoenix
De Beus, J. and Mak, J. (2009) De kwestie Europa. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press.
Van der Brug, W., De Vries, C. and Van Spanje, J. (2011) “Nieuwe strijdpunten, nieuwe 
scheidslijnen? Politieke vertegenwoordiging in Nederland” in: Democratie doorgelicht, R. 
Andeweg en J. Thomassen (red.) Leiden: Leiden University Press
27
Bryman, A. (2008) Social Research Methods. Oxford University Press
Commission-Deetman (1990) Rapport bijzondere commissie Vraagpunten. Tweede Kamer, 
vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 21427, number 3.
Dalton, R.J., Burklin, W.P. and Drummond, A. (2001) “Public Opinion and Direct  
Democracy” in Journal of Democracy: 141-153
Dinan, D. (2005) Ever Closer Union, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan
Down, I. and Wilson, C.J. (2008) “From ‘Permissive Consensus’ to ‘Constraining 
Dissensus’: A Polarizing Union?” in: Acta Politica: 26-49.
Eichenberg, R.C. and Dalton, R.J. (1993) “Europeans and the European Community: the 
dynamics of public support for European integration” in: International Organisation, 47
Van der Eijk, C. and P. van Praag (1998) “Partijen, kiezers en vervagende scheidslijnen” in 
U. Becker (ed.) Maatschappij & Nederlandse politiek: historisch en vergelijkend. Amsterdam: Het 
Spinhuis
Van Grinsven, P., M. van Keulen and J. Rood (2006) Over verkiezingen, politisering
en het Nederlandse Europa-beleid, The Hague: Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale
Betrekkingen, Clingendael.
Held, D. (2006) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity.
Hooghe, L., G.. Marks and C.J. Wilson (2002) “Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions 
on European Integration?” in: Comparative Political Studies 35(8): 965-989.
28
Irwin, G. and J. van Holsteyn (2002) “De kloof tussen burger en bestuur” in: J. van Holsteyn 
and C. Mudde (eds.), Democratie in verval? Amsterdam: Boom, 33-50.
Kiesraad (2005) Proces-verbaal van de zitting van het centraal stembureau inzake de 
vaststelling van de uitslag van het raadplegend referendum over het Verdrag tot vaststelling van een 
Grondwet voor Europa, Den Haag, 6 juni 2005
Koole, R. (1994) 'Grotere kloof tussen burgers en politiek kan geen kwaad', de Volkskrant, 
12 maart 1994
De Lange, S & Rooduijn, M. (2010) Populistische tijdsgeest in Nederland? In: R.
Andeweg & J. Thomassen (eds.), Democratie Doorgelicht, pp. 319-334, Leiden
Mair, P. Polity-scepticism, Party Failings, and the Challenge to European Democracy, 
NIAS,  2006, Uhlenbeck Lecture 24
NRC Handelsblad, “PVV boekt grote winst, zware nederlaag PvdA”, 5 juni 2009, p. 1
Steeg, M. van der (2011), “Het Nederlandse parlement en Europeanisering: is 
democratische controle van de regering nog steeds mogelijk?”, in: Andeweg, R. & J. Thomassen 
(eds.), Democratie doorgelicht: Het functioneren van de Nederlandse democratie. Leiden: Leiden 
University Press, pp. 521-536
Steunenberg, B.(2011), “Onder nationale beleidsambtenaren: Europese beleidsvorming en 
de rol van het Nederlandse parlement”, in: Andeweg, R. & J. Thomassen (eds.), Democratie 
doorgelicht: Het functioneren van de Nederlandse democratie. Leiden: Leiden University Press, pp. 
501-520
Taggart, P. (1998) A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western 
European party systems. European Journal of Political Research, 33, 363-388.
29
De Vries, C. (2009) The Impact of EU Referenda on National Electoral Politics: The Dutch 
Case, West European Politics, 32:1, 142-171
Vollaard, H. and B. Boer (2005) Euroscepsis in Nederland. Utrecht: Lemma
Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (2007), “Europa in Nederland” 
Amsterdam University Press
30
Appendix A
Coding scheme
To measure the degree to which parties can either be perceived as in favour or opposed to further 
European intgration, or alternatively somewhere in between, it is important to code the paragraphs 
of the election manifestos in a consistent manner. This codebook aims to provide validity to the 
coding used in this thesis.
The unit of measurement is the paragraphs. Each party manifesto is scanned for a European chapter 
or section and each paragraph is analysed and awarded a score ranging from 1 to 5. A score of 1 
indicates opposition to further European integration whereas a score of 5 indicates support for 
further integration.
In establishing this coding scheme, earlier work by Dutch Political Scientist Matthijs Rooduijn was 
used to draw inspiration. He wrote a coding scheme called ‘Populism in Election Programs’ for 
doing research into the level of populism in party programmes. His work has been consulted and his 
methods used as a starting point for this coding scheme for European integration.
Indicators are:
o European integration
o Transfer of powers between the nation state and the EU
Whenever a paragraph speaks out in favour of further integration or a further transfer of powers 
from the national to the European level, it is perceived as pro-integration. Whenever there is 
mention of rolling back European integration and transferring powers back to the nation state from 
Europe, then this is a case of opposition to integration.
Score 1: The paragraph only mentions measures and opinions that aim to transfer powers from the 
EU back to the nation state
Score 2: The paragraph mentions some weak measures to transfer some powers back from the EU 
to the nation state, or the paragraph contains support for the status quo and some transfer of powers 
from the EU to the nation state
Score 3: The paragraph mentions support for the status quo or mentions support for both 
transferring power from the EU to the nation state and vice versa
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Score 4: The paragraph mentions some weak measures to transfer some powers from the nation 
state to the EU, or the paragraph contains support for the status quo and some transfer of powers 
from the nation state to the EU
Score 5: The paragraph only mentions measures and opinions that aim to transfer powers from the 
nation state to the EU
The average score of all paragraphs per party is presented as the score per party per election 
manifesto.
Here are some examples to give a better understanding of how coding takes place.
“Transfer of powers to the EU will be frozen until the democratic deficit has been addressed and the  
population supports a further transfer of powers. Until now, way too much sovereignty has been  
given away to undemocratic supranational organs.” SP election programme, 2002.
This paragraph is scored with 1. The aim of the party, according to this text, is for powers to return 
to the nation state. ‘Way too much sovereignty has been given away’ clearly shows the opposition to 
this transfer that has taken place in the past.
“Integration is a political process of small steps and those who go too fast will be thrown back. One 
thing is certain: the organization of the Union needs to be reformed.” D66 election programme, 
2002.
This paragraph has been scored with 3. D66 aims to reform the European Union without speaking 
out about the direction of integration in this paragraph. The party supports neither further 
integration nor rolling back integration, which is why in this text the party supports the status quo. 
This corresponds to score 3.
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Appendix B
List of party programmes analysed in this study
2002
o CDA: Betrokken samenleving, betrouwbare overheid
o ChristenUnie: Durf te kiezen voor normen
o D66: Toekomst in eigen hand
o GroenLinks: Overvloed en onbehagen
o Leefbaar Nederland: Leefbaar Nederland komt er nu aan
o LPF: Zakelijk met een hart
o PvdA: Samen voor de toekomst
o SGP: Tot Uw Dienst
o SP: Eerste weg links
o VVD: Ruimte, respect en vooruitgang
2003
o CDA: Betrokken samenleving, betrouwbare overheid
o ChristenUnie: Samen leven naar Bijbelse waarden
o D66: Juist nu
o GroenLinks: Protest en perspectief
o LPF: Politiek is passie
o PvdA: Samen voor de toekomst
o SGP: Tot Uw Dienst
o SP: Eerste weg links
o VVD: De VVD maakt werk van Nederland
2006
o CDA: Vertrouwen in Nederland, vertrouwen in elkaar
o ChristenUnie: Duurzaam voor elkaar
o D66: Het gaat om mensen
o GroenLinks: Groei mee
o PvdA: Het Nederland van morgen
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o PvdD: 220x liever voor mens, dier, natuur en milieu
o PVV: Verkiezingspamflet
o SGP: Naar eer en geweten
o SP: Een beter Nederland, voor hetzelfde geld
o VVD: Voor een samenleving met ambitie
2010
o CDA: Slagvaardig en samen
o ChristenUnie: Vooruitzien
o D66: Anders Ja
o GroenLinks: Klaar voor de toekomst
o PvdA: Iedereen telt mee
o PvdD: Recepten voor mededogen en duurzaamheid
o PVV: De agenda van hoop en optimisme
o SGP: Daad bij het woord
o SP: Een beter Nederland voor minder geld
o VVD: Orde op zaken
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